smart grid with the vision of surviving a cyber-incident while sustaining critical energy delivery functions.
II. Cybersecurity for the Power Grid -First, Do No Harm
Cybersecurity solutions for critical energy infrastructure are imperative for reliable energy delivery. In today's highly connected world, with an increasingly sophisticated cyberthreat, it is unrealistic to assume energy delivery systems are isolated or immune from compromise. C ybersecurity for the power grid must be carefully engineered to not interfere with energy delivery functions. For instance, the power grid has some legacy devices that are decades old, with limited computational resources and communications bandwidth to support cybersecurity protections. Control and protection devices are widely distributed; some in unmanned, remote substations or on top of poles in publicly accessible areas. Access controls are important and must not jeopardize normal operations or emergency responses. Effective cybersecurity protections are necessary, and must work well within the operational environment of energy delivery systems. T he power grid transmits and distributes electrical power generated from primary fossil or renewable energy resources, such as coal or wind. Computers and networks manage, monitor, protect, and control the continuous, real-time delivery of electrical power (Figure 1) .
A. Computers and networks manage, monitor, protect and control the power grid Operation technology (OT) computers and networks for energy delivery systems allow operators to maintain situational awareness, perform economic dispatch of energy resources, plan for contingencies, and balance generation with load in real time. These capabilities are often provided by an energy management system (EMS) that resides in a utility control center and performs state estimation, contingency analysis and automatic generation control (AGC). The EMS receives data from a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system that acquires power system operating measurements every two to five seconds from specialized devices in substations.
The EMS state estimator uses SCADA data, data conveyed through the Inter-Control Center Communication Protocol (ICCP) from other utility's control centers, and the laws of physics to estimate the operational state of the power grid every few minutes. This information provides operators with the situational awareness to make informed decisions, such as optimized power flow for economic and efficient generation dispatch. State estimators also detect and reject corrupted data from malfunctioning sensors. New methods, such as SecurityOriented Cyber-Physical State Estimation (SCPSE), are being developed to detect data that have been maliciously compromised with the intent to misrepresent grid operations (Zonouz et al., 2012) .
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T he EMS performs real-time contingency analysis to anticipate grid instabilities that might result from a major grid component failure, such as the loss of a generator or transmission line. This analysis shows how power grid operating conditions could evolve in response to the loss of particular components at that moment and supports planning to ensure that grid operating limits would not be violated if such a contingency were to occur. Automated remedial action schemes (RASs) or special protection systems (SPS) ensure the grid remains stable even if a major component is unexpectedly lost. From a cybersecurity perspective, physical consequences of malicious commands can be modeled as contingencies to assess risk and develop mitigations well in advance.
The AGC allows a balancing authority to adjust generation to meet power demand in real time as load connects to and disconnects from the grid. Protection and control devices, such as intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) with embedded operating systems, are used at the generation, transmission, and increasingly the distribution levels. These devices measure and automatically react to grid operating conditions within milliseconds, a few cycles at 60 Hz, to prevent equipment from exceeding safe operating limits and keep the grid stable. Figure 2 shows a simulated angular separation during the Aug. 14, 2003, Northeast Blackout where realtime wide-area visibility could have helped prevent a power outage. PMU measurements, and other energy sector data, are being exchanged between utilities with enhanced security using the Secure Information Exchange Gateway (SIEGate), developed in a partnership led by the Grid Protection Alliance (GPA) (Grid Protection Alliance, 2011).
T he GPS signals often used to time-synchronize PMU measurements across wide regions have low signal strength and can be jammed or spoofed (Jiang et al., 2013; NERC.com, 2014) . Jamming results in a loss of signal that can be mitigated for short intervals by the receiver's internal clock, while spoofing is the intentional adjustment of the time reference provided by GPS. Multiple receivers that crosscheck with each other is one of several methods (Liang et al., 2014) available to protect the integrity of precise time synchronization for the power grid. The Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for the Power Grid (TCIPG) (Tcipg.org, 2014a), an academic collaboration that performs research to reduce the risk of a cyber-incident disrupting energy delivery, is developing further mitigations. Also, other time synchronization methods are being explored, such as networkbased methods, including standards-based approaches to provide interoperability across vendor solutions.
C. Advanced metering infrastructure enables faster outage restoration
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) opens twoway communications between the energy user and the utility. This enables informed, economic energy-usage decisions and hastens the location and recovery of distribution-level outages, further enabled by DA. Prearranged demand response (DR) agreements with energy consumers allow for reduced consumption on distribution feeders through dynamic load control during periods of system peak energy usage to avoid emergency voltage reduction. Cost-effective advanced meter reading (AMR) decreases the need for ''truck rolls'' and saves operational costs. Cybersecurity protections are in place, and being further developed, to protect the security and privacy of these data. Bonneville Power Administration's (BPA's) Synchrophasor Network
The BPA synchrophasor network received a Global Energy Award from Platts for grid optimization in 2013. BPA is part of the ARRA-funded Western Interconnection Synchrophasor Program, a partnership of 19 utilities to provide real-time visibility of the western power system covering 14 states, two Canadian provinces, and a portion of the Baja Peninsula in Mexico. BPA uses a dedicated secure network to share synchrophasor data with 10 other utilities, gaining visibility of the interconnection operating conditions well beyond the agency's borders. BPA collects 137,000 measurements from across the grid every second and analyzes these data in real time to alert dispatchers when the power system is at risk (Energy.gov, 2014a).
(NESCOR) (Smartgrid.epri.com, 2014) has developed a ''SEP 1.x Summary and Analysis (Smartgrid.epri.com, 2003a) '' that provides guidance to further strengthen AMI and HAN cybersecurity protections.
D. Distribution automation enables grid self-healing
In addition to easing outage restoration, DA can avoid additional disruptions by using automated feeder switches to isolate critical facilities and minimize equipment damage.
E. Energy storage provides contingency reserves for grid stability
Distribution automation eases the integration of DER, which include distribution-level equipment and systems that can actively participate in power system operations. Examples are load, plug-in electric vehicles (PEV) with smart chargers, and energy storage that eases the integration of intermittent renewable energy resources, such as wind and solar. NESCOR has developed a report that describes the cybersecurity requirements for DER, reflecting DER functions in the smart grid and taking into account variations of DER architectures (Smartgrid.epri.com, 2003b) .
IV. Advancing the State of the Art of Power Grid Cybersecurity
The following sections present insights of four SGIG recipients that are advancing the state of the art of power grid security by designing cybersecurity into the foundation of the smart grid.
A. Duke Energy Progress
Duke Energy Progress's EnergyWise initiatives leverage existing program/project management organizational structures, standards, and disciplines to manage for on-time, on-budget delivery while ensuring benefits realization. This includes the following activities and business drivers:
Consolidated Edison Company of New York (Con Edison) Expedites Recovery from Super Storm Sandy
Con Edison is deploying DA to operate resiliently against disruptions, reducing outages and hastening outage restoration. The company has expanded automated overhead switches by 35 percent, resulting in more than 17,000 avoided customer outages. During Hurricane Sandy, Con Edison avoided more than 100 truck rolls through automated operation of overhead circuits to minimize customer impact. Con Edison has also implemented SCADA systems with enhanced cybersecurity that reduce the risk of a cyber-attack.
Applied Communication Sciences (ACS) Real-Time Anomaly and
Intrusion Detection for AMI and DA ACS is partnering with Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) to address security, operations, and engineering needs in the selfforming mesh networks beyond the wireless gateways. For AMI, the project works to ensure that customer privacy is preserved and customer data is protected in automated meter reads. For DA, the project helps utilities continuously validate over-the-air security controls, mitigate supply chain cyber-threats, and monitor the field network health, performance, and security in real-time. Visit www.controlsystemsroadmap.net for more.
In 2009, as part of its ARRA grant proposal, SMUD stated a desire to deploy a wireless RF intrusion detection system for its yet-to-bedeployed smart meter network. When the time came to begin the wireless Intrusion Detection System (IDS) project in early 2012, there were no commercial products available to provide the desired functionality. So SMUD partnered with ACS to jointly develop a solution. The project went live in spring of 2013, and although this work is not yet considered complete, SMUD has already realized a number of benefits from this effort that have further strengthened existing cybersecurity protections and innovated new capabilities as well. They also report lateral benefits from the system, such as enhanced working relationships between information security, the meter shop, and DA teams (Controlsystemsroadmap.net, 2014 Deploy monitoring capability to critical transmission infrastructure for asset and demand management functionality;
Deploy feeder automation to advance partial restoration capabilities, and
Build an advanced analytics engine that forecasts, coordinates and models a comprehensive view of smart grid energy and efficiency capabilities.
The initiatives include a wide range of smart grid technologies. Figure 3 offers a list of the initiatives that challenged the normal approaches and work practices of operations technology (OT), information technology (IT), and supply chain professionals. D uke Energy Progress's fundamental approach to cybersecurity leverages a simple defense-in-depth architecture including the principles of ''least privilege'' and default ''deny access'' controls. Through ongoing threat monitoring activities (including some paid threat monitoring and alerting services), we know that cybersecurity threats continue to increase in number, complexity, and level of impact. At the same time, business needs are driving requirements for increasing access and interoperability across enterprise applications, process computing environments, enterprise networks, and the Internet. These requirements are rooted in the need for sharing of data as a business enabler and increased leverage of automation and intelligent technologies being implemented. Many times these business needs are in direct conflict with security objectives, presenting unique challenges and driving the need to better leverage our existing risk management methodology. This business-risk balanced approach required further maturity of our risk management lifecycle so that more risk evaluation was performed during product selection, implementation, and post-deployment.
T he operational technology and information technology collaboration is largely education and awareness of each other's perspective, so together the resulting solution best meets the business needs and provides adequate security. This alignment of skills drives thorough evaluation of the requirements, product capabilities and integration needed to provide the right capability for the business and security capabilities. To ensure communication and coordination, we developed a new Enterprise Architecture Review Process (EARP) and created a committee made up of OT and IT architects and engineers to provide standards, guidance, and governance to our project teams. These formal reviews (gates) require specific artifacts demonstrating adherence to standards and documented follow-up of issues, questions, and resolution of outstanding items. The success of this process has been so positive that some project teams are even soliciting additional EARP ''pregate'' reviews aimed at achieving understanding, guidance and consensus of the architecture review committee earlier than required in the formal process. Also, the new reference architecture artifacts created through the process have already paid off in efficiency gains as reuse opportunities have already been realized. A number of risks were identified as a part of developing the plan. These risks include: physical access to smart meters and other devices exposed to the public, privacy concerns, and wireless transmission of data. In some cases, these risks required a new thought process and additional controls to be implemented for mitigation.
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Many of the controls to mitigate identified vulnerabilities and risks were already in place at FirstEnergy. It is the goal of the plan to ensure that these controls are applied to the new technology deployed as part of the SGIG project. Processes such as project review, patching, and assessments are described as part of the ongoing project lifecycle.
The cybersecurity challenges FirstEnergy has experienced with the SGIG project are those experienced by most cybersecurity organizations. For instance, working with vendors to clarify the need to maintain a balance between proprietary communications and inspectability. For instance, vendors need to understand what is or isn't normal for smart meter communications, especially with regard to implementing the Amilyzer (see below). An additional challenge is the classic conflicting goals of functionality vs. security, i.e. how to make it work while ensuring it is secure. In most cases, this requires new best practices or innovations due to a bolting-on of security by vendors who have always considered physical security aspects, and must now also consider the cybersecurity aspects. Finally, metrics are a challenge. How do you quantify security testing success? Assessments work well to a degree, but is the answer that a device hasn't been exploited a real measure? Or has the vulnerability not been made known or discovered at the time. W orking through the cybersecurity aspects of the SGIG project, we have learned that we need to have an assurance of our engineers' and project managers' awareness of cybersecurity. They must be able to ask themselves, ''Is this a cybersecurity concern?'' Additionally, it is important to be involved in project meetings, to understand what is happening and when, in order to provide the necessary consulting to ensure cybersecurity concerns are addressed and controls are implemented. Vendors need to increasingly consider appropriate cybersecurity controls now.
Utilities have been addressing these for some time, and it is encouraging that vendors have taken the initiative to develop more cybersecurity controls in their devices and update issues found in their software/ firmware. These lessons learned offer several examples of how this project has contributed to advancing the state of the art for energy sector cybersecurity.
Amilyzer
In early 2012, FirstEnergy and researchers at TCIPG started collaborating on a new specification-based IDS system for smart meters called Amilyzer (Tcipg.org, 2014b). The software system passively monitors AMI traffic at the network, transport, and application layers to ensure that smart meters are running in a secure state and that their operations respect a specified security policy. This policy is derived from the electric sector failure scenarios defined by NESCOR (Smartgrid.epri.com, 2014) . Amilyzer has been successfully deployed by FirstEnergy in a testing state to monitor a 12,000-meter AMI over the past year.
Amilyzer provides in-depth visibility over the traffic captured between the collection engines and meters. An important challenge has been to translate the large volume of low-level packets captured into high-level actionable information that security engineers can leverage to ensure the resiliency of the infrastructure. Being able to test Amilyzer on a live AMI has enabled the team to greatly improve the C12.22 packet dissection library and to develop a more robust system. The team is now working on finalizing a Web user interface to allow the security team to visualize periodic reports and to write custom IDS signatures. From a research perspective, traffic analysis algorithms are now being developed to be able to gain better visibility over encrypted traffic without having to share decryption keys with the IDS sensors.
C. Northern Virginia Electric Cooperative
NOVEC recognized the value and the need for a formal, structured, approach to cybersecurity following the initial 2007 deployment of digital substation equipment, generally described with the common term of ''intelligent electronic devices (IEDs).'' While the operational benefits of the technology were realized early on, the potential vulnerability of digital equipment, via the SCADA and substation networks, to unauthorized access and control became a recognized concern. T he SGIG program provided an impetus to elevate cybersecurity to a higher level of active functional management. This initiative takes place within an integrated approach to protect the electric distribution system as well as the key interfacing business systems. The SGIG process recognized the various emerging standards and cyber principles which have provided guidance to develop an effective framework and implementation plan. Some of these guidance documents and standards referenced in the development of NOVEC's plan included 21 Steps to Improve Cyber Security of SCADA Networks (Energy.gov, 2014b), NIST cybersecurity and interoperability standards, NERC CIP standards, and others.
A guiding principle has been to ensure physical separation of the substation and SCADA networks from the corporate enterprise network and, indirectly, the Internet. NOVEC adheres to the ''Do no harm'' principle by carefully selecting security hardware and software tools, systems, and protocols that will not compromise the ultimate purpose of the IED's and automation system, which is to sustain NOVEC's very high level of system reliability. 
